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GET BACK: THE DELAWARE SUPREME COURT DISCOURAGES
APPRAISAL ARBITRAGE IN DFC GLOBAL CORPORATION V.
MUIRFIELD VALUE PARTNERS, L.P.
ABRAHAM SCHNEIDER*
“In economics, the value of something is what it will fetch in the
market.  That is true of corporations, just as it is true of gold.”1
I. I ME MINE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE “PROBLEM” OF
APPRAISAL ARBITRAGE
For ten years, investors have been eating a free lunch in the Delaware
courts through the practice of “appraisal arbitrage.”2  Delaware originally
established protection for a corporation’s minority shareholders 118 years
ago by granting them appraisal rights: if a company undergoes a merger
or a consolidation, and shareholders dissent, they can take their shares to
the court and have the court decide on a fair value.3  It was not until 2007,
however, that savvy investors realized the opportunity appraisal provided
and began the practice of appraisal arbitrage.4  In a single decade, arbi-
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law.
All titles and headings in this Casebrief are inspired by Beatles song titles.  This
Casebrief is dedicated to my generous and loving wife, Katie (and her whole
generous and loving family); to my law school Virgil, Doug Baker, who has found
me wandering in too many dark woods to count; to the Honorable Mark A.
Kearney, who pointed my Roman nose south toward the First State; and, finally, to
my dear father, Dave Schneider, who threatened to have me shot when he heard I
was going to law school, but who was probably kidding.
1. See DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 368–69
(Del. 2017) (emphasizing fairness of market price).
2. See W. Schachermayer, The Notion of Arbitrage and Free Lunch in Mathematical
Finance, in ASPECTS OF MATHEMATICAL FINANCE 15 (Marc Yor, ed. 2008) (describing
financial arbitrage as equivalent to “picking up money that is lying around”).
3. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (West 2017) (granting appraisal rights to
dissenting shareholders); see also Charlotte K. Newell, The Legislative Origins of To-
day’s Appraisal Debate: A Look Back at the Evolution of the DGCL and the Origins of the
Explosive Rise in “Appraisal Arbitrage” Filings, 35 DEL. LAW. 12, 13 (Summer 2017)
(explaining history of appraisal rights); Jay W. Eisenhofer & John L. Reed, Valua-
tion Litigation, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 37, 41 n.9 (1997) (noting that Delaware granted
appraisal rights when it enacted its law of corporations in 1899).
4. See generally Stanley Onyeador, The Chancery Bank of Delaware: Appraisal Arbi-
trageurs Expose Need to Further Reform Defective Appraisal Statute, 70 VAND. L. REV. 339,
348–49 (2017) (noting surge in both number of appraisal litigation cases brought
and in value of appraisals between 2004–2014).  For a discussion of arbitrage’s
incipient 2007 case, In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., No. CIV.A. 1554-
CC, 2007 WL 1378345 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007), see infra note 48 and accompanying
text.
(723)
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trage turned appraisal rights into the hottest issue in Delaware corporate
law.5
Arbitrage means profiting by purchasing assets in one market and im-
mediately selling them for a higher price in a different market.6  In ap-
praisal arbitrage, an investor purchases shares in a company just before a
merger, then, immediately after the merger finalizes, the investor sues for
appraisal, hoping the courts will value the shares at a price higher than the
deal.7  If the court finds the shares are worth more than the deal price, the
surviving corporation in the merger must pay the dissenting shareholders
the court’s appraisal price.8  Though not entirely risk free, appraisal arbi-
trage has become a popular, profitable, and safe investment strategy.9
The “problem” with appraisal arbitrage is that Delaware’s appraisal
statute was intended to vindicate the rights of oppressed minority share-
holders, not to provide an investment vehicle for hedge funds.10  Some
see “arbitrageurs” as filing strike suits that can add a price tag of hundreds
of millions of dollars onto a merger.11  Others see the practice as positive:
some studies suggest that appraisal arbitrage is more likely to target merg-
ers that are vulnerable to minority shareholder exploitation.12  While the
5. See Newell, supra note 3, at 12 (“Appraisal is now a hot topic at corporate
law conferences and the subject of more than half the M&A cases Law360 has
identified as the ‘most important to watch’ in 2017.”); see also Charles R. Korsmo &
Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public Company M&A, 92 WASH.
U.L. REV. 1551, 1612 (2015) (“Until now, the academic consensus has been that
appraisal litigation is a peripheral sideshow. This view, which may have been accu-
rate as recently as 2009, must now be radically revised.”).
6. See Arbitrage, DICTIONARY.COM, www.dictionary.com/browse/arbitrage [https:
//perma.cc/FU2S-EYEF] (last visited Sep. 27, 2018) (defining arbitrage).
7. See Jay B. Kesten, The Uncertain Case for Appraisal Arbitrage, 52 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 89, 102 (2017) (describing strategy behind appraisal arbitrage).  Kesten
points out that in traditional merger arbitrage, an arbitrageur buys a large number
of shares at a slight discount due to the uncertainty of the merger finalizing, then
votes in favor of the merger and profits from the increased price of the consum-
mated merger. See id.  (explaining traditional arbitrage).  Appraisal arbitrage does
the opposite, buying shares and voting against the merger despite profiting from
its consummation. See id. at 89–90 (comparing traditional and appraisal arbitrage
approaches).
8. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(i) (requiring payment of court’s appraisal
price).
9. See Kesten, supra note 7, at 89–90 (describing popularity and profitability of
arbitrage).  Kesten states that “[h]edge funds specializing in appraisal arbitrage
have raised billions of dollars in recent years.” Id. at 89 (evaluating increasing
activity in appraisal arbitrage).  Because of the profitability, “appraisal claims have
surged in both number and economic significance.” Id. at 90 (noting increase in
appraisal arbitrage).
10. For an in-depth discussion of appraisal arbitrage’s contravention of the
intent of § 262, see infra note 48 and accompanying text.
11. See Korsmo, supra note 5, at 1571 (describing value of arbitrage claims).
For a discussion of appraisal arbitrage as strike suits, see infra note 49 and accom-
panying text.
12. See Wei Jiang, Tao Li, Danquing Mei & Randall Thomas, Appraisal: Share-
holder Remedy or Litigation Arbitrage?, 59 J.L. & ECON. 697, 699–700 (2016) (explain-
2
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possibility of arbitrage may keep companies honest when the merger price
is low or the deal is suspicious, the practice itself can seem dubious when
the merger is entirely fair—a so-called “clean” merger.13  In a clean
merger, where the company is put up for auction and there is no conflict
of interest in the sale, the market has already decided on a fair price for
the company.14  Should it be acceptable for arbitrageurs to get more than
other shareholders because a judge disagrees with the market’s price?15
Although appraisal arbitrage is legal, the Delaware courts and legisla-
ture have recently executed a pincer movement to discourage arbitrage in
clean mergers.16  The profit in arbitrage comes from two sources, roughly
in equal proportions: half comes from the award of a higher share price by
the Court of Chancery, and half comes from pre-judgment interest ac-
crued during litigation.17  On one side of the pincer, the Delaware legisla-
ture has allowed companies to avoid interest payments through statutory
amendment, and on the other side, the Delaware Supreme Court, in DFC
ing data showing appraisal litigation, including arbitrage, is most likely where
there are conflicts of interest or low takeover premium, as well as in going-private
deals, minority squeeze outs, and short-form mergers after tender offers); Korsmo,
supra note 5, at 1595 (concluding that arbitrageurs “appear  to  target  transactions
with,  all  else  equal,  lower  merger  premia.”). But see Kesten, supra note 7, at 92
(contending that empirical studies “cast doubt on whether appraisal arbitrageurs
systematically target underpriced deals”).
13. See Onyeador, supra note 4, at 352 (“[B]y challenging many mergers that
do not have characteristics of unfair merger pricing, arbitrageurs do not use the
appraisal remedy to ensure fairness to minority shareholders as the remedy in-
tends.”). See generally Hon. Sam Glasscock III, Ruminations on Appraisal: What Are the
Policy Implications of A Dissenter’s Right to Appraisal in A “Clean” Transaction?, 35 DEL.
LAW. 8, 8 (Summer 2017) (dubbing mergers “clean” when “the stock is readily
transferable, approved by a disinterested board independent of any controller or
other conflict, and where the sale is consummated after an exposure to the mar-
ket”).  To avoid repeating the conditions of a fair market transaction, this
Casebrief will also utilize the term “clean” to describe unconflicted and market-
tested transactions.
14. See DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346,
369–70 (Del. 2017) (emphasizing fairness of market price in clean mergers).
15. See id. at 367 (warning that judges “should have little confidence [they]
can be the special one[s] able to outwit the larger universe of equally avid capital-
ists”); see also Jiang, supra note 12, at 700 (explaining that arbitrageurs receive pre-
miums because acquiring companies “are always better off paying the appraisal
award to the dissenters rather than trying to preempt the petitions by offering a
more generous premium in the transaction to all shareholders”); Kesten, supra
note 7, at 127–28 (arguing that appraisal arbitrage does more than realize pre-
mium; it “perniciously redistributes value from acquirers and ordinary sharehold-
ers to the arbitrageurs”).
16. Cf. Kesten, supra note 7, at 91–92 (describing string of Court of Chancery
cases finding deal price was fair value and describing amendments to § 262).
17. See Jiang, supra note 12, at 700 (“Among the cases that go to trial, judi-
cially ordered valuation improvements and prejudgment interest accruals consti-
tute roughly equal proportions of the total gain.”).  Data shows interest accrual
accounts for slightly more than half, or 53.4% of the awards in appraisal cases. See
id. at 726–27 (examining appraisal case outcomes).
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Global Corporation v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P.,18 has ruled that in a
clean merger, the deal price is the best indicator of fair value, except in
extreme circumstances.19  Taken together, the statutory amendments and
DFC Global are likely to starve arbitrageurs by making the practice unprofit-
able in clean mergers.20
This Casebrief asserts that the Supreme Court of Delaware navigated
this controversial topic by following the legislature’s lead in starving arbi-
trage in clean mergers while preserving judicial discretion to allow ap-
praisal when there is a danger of minority shareholder exploitation.21
Part II provides background information regarding appraisal rights, ap-
praisal arbitrage, and Delaware’s legislative and judicial reactions to the
practice.22  Part III discusses the facts of DFC Global, including the merger,
the appraisal, and the appeal, and provides an analysis of the court’s rea-
soning.23  Part IV analyzes the court’s decision and comments on the fu-
ture of appraisal arbitrage for practicing attorneys.24  Finally, Part V
assesses the potential impact of DFC Global for arbitrageurs, companies,
and shareholders.25
II. MAXWELL’S SILVER HAMMER: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF
APPRAISAL ARBITRAGE
Appraisal rights emerged a century and a half ago to protect dissent-
ing shareholders while allowing corporations to make decisions without
unanimous consent.26  More recently, investors introduced appraisal arbi-
trage by purchasing shares in a corporation prior to a merger solely to
profit from the appraisal rights that came with the shares.27  Arbitrage
18. 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017).
19. For an in-depth discussion of Delaware’s legislative amendments, see infra
notes 59–62 and accompanying text.  For an in-depth discussion of the holding in
DFC Global, see infra notes 99–142 and accompanying text.
20. For an in-depth discussion of the potential effects of DFC Global, see infra
notes 143–80 and accompanying text.
21. For an in-depth analysis of the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion, see
infra notes 143–56 and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion of the origin and development of appraisal rights,
arbitrage, and the response to arbitrage, see infra notes 26–66 and accompanying
text.
23. For a further discussion of the facts of DFC Global, see infra notes 67–98
and accompanying text.  For a narrative analysis of the DFC Global decision, see
infra notes 99–142 and accompanying text.
24. For a critical analysis of the DFC Global decision and its potential effect on
practicing attorneys, see infra notes 144–74 and accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of the impact of the DFC Global decision, see infra notes
175–84 and accompanying text.
26. See Korsmo, supra note 5, at 1558 (explaining origins of appraisal rights’
role in transition from unanimity to majority voting requirements in corporate
law).
27. See Tom Hals, Court Reverses Dell Buyout Ruling that Alarmed Dealmakers,
REUTERS TECH. NEWS (Dec. 14, 2017, 12:10 PM), https://www.metro.us/news/
reuters/court-reverses-dell-buyout-ruling-alarmed-dealmakers [https://perma.cc/
4
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works because the courts often value shares higher than the deal price,
and the corporation pays interest to the dissenting shareholders until the
appraisal is complete.28  Delaware courts have showed increasing skepti-
cism of the practice, and both the courts and the legislature have taken
steps to discourage appraisal arbitrage in clean mergers.29
A. Everybody’s Got Something to Hide Except Me and My Monkey: A Brief
History of Appraisal Rights
The Delaware appraisal remedy was born out of corporate necessity.30
Until the late 1800s, a unanimous quorum of the corporation’s sharehold-
ers had to approve every corporate decision.31  Appraisal rights emerged
when corporations realized not every decision could be unanimous if the
corporations were to continue to expand.32  Appraisal rights resolved this
problem by allowing corporations to take action despite some shareholder
dissent by providing the dissenters a mechanism to petition the courts for
redress.33
V35N-AHJ9] (“[A]ppraisal has become an investment strategy for sophisticated
hedge funds, which buy shares just before a deal closes then seek to profit in
court.”).
28. For an in-depth discussion of the profitability of arbitrage through ap-
praisal award and interest, see infra notes 41–45 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Victor Lewkow, Meredith E. Kotler & Mark E. McDonald, Delaware
Supreme Court’s Dell Decision Further Reduces Appraisal Risks for Buyers, CLEARY M&A &
CORP. GOVERNANCE WATCH (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.clearymawatch.com/
2017/12/delaware-supreme-courts-dell-decision-reduces-appraisal-risks-buyers/
[https://perma.cc/5GQN-93YD] (suggesting Delaware Supreme Court is increas-
ingly limiting arbitrage practice); Anne Tucker, Tides May Be Slowly Turning in Dela-
ware Appraisal Arbitrage, LAW PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK (Aug. 17, 2016), http://
lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2016/08/guest-post-tides-may-be-slowly-
turning-in-delaware-appraisal-arbitrage.html [https://perma.cc/CVN3-AF6R]
(suggesting Delaware intends to shut down arbitrage practice).  For an in-depth
discussion of the legislative and judicial reactions to the practice of appraisal arbi-
trage, see infra notes 54–62 and accompanying text.
30. See 4 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COR-
PORATIONS § 22:24 (3d ed. 2017) (explaining that appraisal remedies arose be-
cause of “expansion of commerce in the nineteenth century,” which “created a
need for bigger and more complex corporations” that could make decisions with-
out unanimous approval).
31. See Newell, supra note 3, at 13 (describing early corporation law).
32. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 30 (“The rule of unanimity impeded corpo-
rate growth because any shareholder could prevent a corporate combination if he
did not agree.”).  The first state to introduce appraisal rights was Pennsylvania in
1858, when shareholders dissented from a railroad merger. See Lauman v. Leba-
non Valley R.R., 30 Pa. 42, 45–48 (1858) (introducing appraisal rights).
33. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 30 (explaining how appraisal rights solved
the lack of contract and property rights that occurred when corporations overrode
dissenting shareholders). But see Korsmo, supra note 5, at 1560 (noting “[a]p-
praisal has long been regarded in the corporate law literature as an almost useless
remedy” because individual shareholders have little motivation to bring suits, and
corporations can easily circumvent appraisal rights).
5
Schneider: Get Back: The Delaware Supreme Court Discourages Appraisal Arbitr
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
728 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63: p. 723
Section 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law codifies ap-
praisal rights and requires the Court of Chancery to determine a “fair
value” for the shares.34  The statute also sets out several requirements
shareholders must meet before they may invoke appraisal rights, including
owning the shares at the date of the merger and “perfecting” their ap-
praisal rights by dissenting from the merger.35  Originally instituted in the
late 1800s, Delaware’s appraisal statute “enjoyed a relatively sleepy his-
tory.”36  Ten years ago, this “sleepy” statute suddenly became the hottest
topic in Delaware corporate law because of the practice known as ap-
praisal arbitrage.37
B. Taxman: What Appraisal Arbitrage is and How It Developed
Appraisal arbitrage is an investment model centered around appraisal
litigation.38  It occurs when an investor, usually a hedge fund or capital
equity firm, purchases shares in a company after it has announced a
34. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (West 2017) (granting appraisal rights).
Today, “fair value” generally requires “proof of value by any techniques or methods
which are generally considered acceptable in the financial community.” See
Laidler v. Hesco Bastion Envtl., Inc., Civil Action No. 7561–VCG, 2014 WL
1877536, at *6 (Del. Ch. May 12, 2014) (explaining requirements for and meaning
of fair value) (quoting Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com, Inc., No. Civ. A. 19734, 2004
WL 1152338, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2004)).  For an in-depth discussion of the
history of “fair value,” see infra note 57 and accompanying text.
35. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (providing requirements to invoke ap-
praisal rights).  Section 262(a) describes the basic requirements:
(a) Any stockholder of a corporation of this State who holds shares of
stock on the date of the making of a demand pursuant to subsection (d)
of this section [subsection (d) requires a shareholder to perfect appraisal
rights by dissenting from the merger] with respect to such shares, who
continuously holds such shares through the effective date of the merger
or consolidation, who has otherwise complied with subsection (d) of this
section and who has neither voted in favor of the merger or consolidation
nor consented thereto in writing pursuant to § 228 of this title shall be
entitled to an appraisal by the Court of Chancery of the fair value of the
stockholder’s shares of stock. . . .
Id.  Section 262(d) requires the shareholder to perfect appraisal rights by dissent-
ing from the merger and suing for appraisal within a restricted time frame. See
§ 262(d) (requiring perfection of appraisal rights).
36. See Jiang, supra note 12, at 701 (“[F]rom 1977 to 1997 only an average of
14 appraisal petitions were filed annually in Delaware, many by individual share-
holders acting without legal counsel, which were quickly dismissed” (citing Randall
S. Thomas, Revising the Delaware Appraisal Statute, DEL. L. REV. 3:1-35 (2000)));
Newell, supra note 3, at 15 (noting appraisal remedy is seldom utilized).
37. See Newell, supra note 3, at 12 (“Appraisal is now a hot topic at corporate
law conferences and the subject of more than half the M&A cases Law360 has
identified as the ‘most important to watch’ in 2017.”); see also Korsmo, supra note 5,
at 1612 (“Until now, the academic consensus has been that appraisal litigation is a
peripheral sideshow.  This view, which may have been accurate as recently as 2009,
must now be radically revised.”).
38. See Craig Boyd, Comment, Appraisal Arbitrage: Closing the Floodgates on Hedge
Funds and Activist Shareholders, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 497, 497–98 (2016) (describing
appraisal arbitrage).
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merger but before the merger occurs.39  The investor purchases the shares
for the sole purpose of dissenting from the merger and taking the shares
to court to have them appraised.40
Appraisal arbitrage works as an investing technique for two reasons.41
First, the surviving company in the merger must pay the dissenting share-
holders the court’s appraisal price.42  The Court of Chancery often finds
the company undervalued—meaning the dissenting shareholders make
the difference as profit.43  Second, Section 262 requires the surviving cor-
poration to pay dissenting shareholders the federal interest rate, plus five
percent, on the price of their dissenting shares while the appraisal action
is underway.44  Because appraisal actions often take up to three years to
complete, arbitrageurs earn a healthy and predictable rate of return on
the shares and realize a profit even if the court ultimately finds the deal
price was fair.45  Appraisal arbitrage has become a powerful force, “utterly
39. See Glasscock, supra note 13, at 11 (describing appraisal arbitrage as “a
phenomenon facilitated by our appraisal statute, as written: the statute permits
stockholders who have purchased stock after announcement of the merger to per-
fect the right to an appraisal”); Jiang, supra note 12, at 701 (explaining that hedge
funds are “the main driving force” behind appraisal arbitrage); Korsmo, supra note
5, at 1573 (“[S]pecialized appraisal petitioners . . . typically . . . invest in the target
company after the announcement of the transaction they challenge.”); id. at
1572–73 (discussing trend of appraisal litigation increasingly brought by “special-
ized and sophisticated” investment firms that specialize in appraisal arbitrage).
40. See Korsmo, supra note 5, at 1573 (“The decision to invest . . . is based on a
calculation that the amount they will be able to recover in an appraisal proceeding
in Delaware . . . will exceed the merger price by enough to offer an attractive
return.”).
41. See Gardner Davis & Victoria Matese, Delaware High Court Says a Fair Deal
Price Should Get the Most Weight in Appraisal Valuation, 33 WESTLAW J. CORP. OFFICERS
& DIRECTOR LIABILITY, Sep. 5, 2017, at 1 (describing reliability of profit in appraisal
arbitrage actions prior to DFC Global); Jiang, supra note 12, at 699 (describing high
average rate of return on appraisal actions when viewed as investment).
42. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(i) (West 2017) (requiring payment of
court’s evaluation of fair value).
43. See Claudia H. Allen, Holly J. Gregory, Gregory V. Varallo & Susan M.
Hannigan, Proceedings of the 2016 Delaware Business Law Forum: A Review and Debate of
the Public Policy Implications of Delaware Law, 72 BUS. L. 755, 760 (2017)
(“[A]ppraisal arbitrageurs may be motivated by decisions from the Court of Chan-
cery awarding fair values in excess of transactions prices” (citing Gaurav Jetley &
Xinyu Ji, Appraisal Arbitrage—Is There a Delaware Advantage?, 71 BUS. L. 427, 429
(2016))).
44. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (outlining requirements for interest
payments). See generally Jiang, supra note 12, at 701 (explaining award of statutory
interest of federal rate plus five percent).  As Jiang points out, appraisal arbitrage
works as an investment strategy because “[t]his interest rate is significantly higher
than that available on many fixed-income investments.” Id. (explaining profitabil-
ity of appraisal arbitrage).  Additionally, Kesten writes that “a favorable interest
rate is at least one important determinant of appraisal claims.” See Kesten, supra
note 7, at 116 (explaining role of interest rate in viability of appraisal arbitrage).
45. See Jiang, supra note 12, at 725 (“[T]he interest accrual essentially ensures
that the appraisal arbitrageurs never receive negative raw returnsFalse”). But see
Korsmo, supra note 5, at 1554 (suggesting “the idea that interest rates are driving
sophisticated parties to target appraisal is implausible” because of risks of using
7
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transform[ing] what may once have been accurately characterized as a
sleepy corporate law backwater.”46
It is not difficult to see why appraisal arbitrage is a controversial topic:
the legislature instituted Section 262 to vindicate the rights of oppressed
minority shareholders who could not make their voices heard in corporate
decisions.47  Arbitrageurs are hardly oppressed shareholders; they are
savvy investors, and some see them as parasites on mergers and acquisi-
tions for which they otherwise have no concern.48  Arbitrage is a business
tactic based on a statute that was not enacted to defend the rights of arbi-
trageurs.49  Further, arbitrage is sometimes seen as adding a tax that com-
illiquid and unsecured legal claim as investment tool).  Korsmo argues the rise in
appraisal litigation is a phenomenon attached to the general rise in fiduciary litiga-
tion related to mergers. See id. (offering alternate explanation for rise in appraisal
arbitrage).  Regarding length of appraisal arbitration claim and prejudgment in-
terest, see Jiang, supra note 12, at 697 (explaining that appraisal litigation ordina-
rily reaches judgment “1-3 years after completion of the merger,” and that
dissenting shareholders receive “appraised value with accrued prejudgment
interest”).
46. See Korsmo, supra note 12, at 1553 (describing transformative effect of
arbitrage on appraisal law).
47. For a discussion on the origins of Section 262, see supra note 30, and
accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 38, at 497 (“[C]laims are not being brought by
the dissenting minority shareholders that Section 262 was designed to protect.
The surge of new plaintiffs has primarily been hedge funds and activist sharehold-
ers attempting to take advantage of an unjust investment strategy . . . .”); see also In
re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., No. Civ. A. 1554-CC, 2007 WL
1378345, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007) (voicing concern that appraisal arbitrage
would “pervert the goals of the appraisal statute by allowing it to be used as an
investment tool”). But see Jiang, supra note 12, at 697 (“Appraisal petitions are
more likely to be filed against mergers with perceived conflicts of interest, includ-
ing going-private deals, minority squeeze outs, and acquisitions with low premi-
ums, which makes them a potentially important governance mechanism.”);
Korsmo, supra note 5, at 1555 (arguing “that the rise of appraisal arbitrage is, on
balance, a beneficial development” because arbitrageurs “target transactions with
lower deal premia and also going-private transactions, where minority sharehold-
ers are most likely to face expropriation.”).  Korsmo argues that the motivation of
appraisal arbitrageurs and exploited minority shareholders are aligned, because
transactions vulnerable to exploitation tend to prove the most beneficial to arbi-
trageurs, and therefore appraisal arbitrage generally produces meritorious, rather
than nuisance claims. See id. at 1596–97 (arguing that appraisal arbitrage generally
benefits shareholders).  Moreover, there is some evidence that appraisal arbitrage
has increased deal premiums across the board, benefiting all shareholders, not just
dissenting shareholders. See Chas Kidwell & Kyle Schrodi, Delaware Limits Appraisal
Rights, but at What Cost?, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 2, 2017) https://www.lexology.com/li-
brary/detail.aspx?g=9d07424b-5770-4b46-a3b8-1236d2c66bd6 [https://perma.cc/
H5S6-R2GR] (arguing appraisal arbitrage is beneficial because it increases deal
prices).
49. See, e.g., George S. Geis, An Appraisal Puzzle, 105 NW. L. REV. 1635, 1664
(2011) (suggesting appraisal is “a back-end cesspool for strike suits.”); Glasscock,
supra note 13, at 29 (“The dissenting stockholder in solicitude for whom the stat-
ute was ostensibly designed is absent in this scenario.”); Jiang, supra note 12, at 698
(“The sharp increase of appraisal arbitrage has stoked concerns that a new form of
strike suit has been born.”).  Taking a milder tone than Geis, Vice Chancellor
8
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panies must now consider when approaching a sale or purchase, and
sometimes the tax can be large enough to prevent a deal from happen-
ing.50  Nevertheless, despite some scholars suggesting the practice may be
“antithetical to policy goals of the appraisal remedy,” appraisal arbitrage is
legal.51
Glasscock notes that “arbitrageurs are hardly dissenters.” See Glasscock, supra note
13, at 29 (examining motivations of arbitrageurs).  In fact, though arbitrageurs
dissent from a merger to perfect their appraisal rights, the situation they “most
fear” is that the merger will not be approved. See id. (explaining arbitrageurs’ in-
terests in mergers).  This puts arbitrageurs in an ironic position: to perfect ap-
praisal rights, they must dissent from the merger, but if their voices are heard and
the dissent prevails, they stand to lose a great deal of money because the share
price will revert to its level from before the merger announcement bolstered its
value. See id. (explaining contradiction between arbitrageurs’ votes and desired
outcome).  This situation demonstrates that arbitrageurs are only technically dis-
senters, not true minority shareholders attempting to prevent a merger and seek-
ing redress when their attempts fail. See id. (emphasizing that arbitrageurs do not
vindicate rights protected by Delaware’s appraisal statute).
50. See Desiree M. Baca, Curbing Arbitrage: The Case for Reappraisal of Delaware’s
Appraisal Rights, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 425, 443 (2017) (describing appraisal arbi-
trage as “value-reducing because it essentially imposes an appraisal tax on transac-
tions.”) (citing Abigail Pickering Bomba, Shareholder Activism in M&A—Checklists
. . . and the Future, FRIED FRANK M&A BRIEFING (July 7, 2014), www.friedfrank.com/
siteFiles/Publications/Final%20-%207-10-2014%20TOC%20Memo%20-%20
Shareholder%20Activism%20in%20MA%20Checklists1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9YH4-4U9G]); id. at 444 (contending that threat of appraisal arbitrage creates risk
of preventing deal); see also Korsmo, supra note 5, at 1571–72 (showing that ap-
praisal claims have increased not only in number but in value of each claim); id. at
1600 (citing concern that “acquirers will come to view the risk of appraisal as essen-
tially a tax that raises the costs of acquiring a company”); Onyeador, supra note 4,
at 356 (suggesting that arbitrage creates liquidity and litigation risks in scale large
enough to gridlock some mergers).  Appraisal arbitrage, because it has not tradi-
tionally differentiated between clean and interested or conflicted transactions, may
discourage counsel from attempting the extra work necessary to have a clean trans-
action. See Adam B. Frankel, Reflections on Appraisal: Litigation As New Technologies
Disrupt Traditional Markets, Discounted Cash Flow Valuations May Be Inadequate in De-
termining Fair Deal Values, 35 DEL. L. 20, 20 (Summer 2017) (suggesting mergers
and acquisitions lawyers lack motivation to pursue clean mergers because of arbi-
trage).  Appraisal arbitrage has been a great enough force to significantly increase
deal prices and even gridlock deals. See Steven Epstein, Delaware Appraisal: Practical
Considerations, BUS. L. TODAY (Oct. 2014), http://www.americanbar.org/publica-
tions/blt/2014/10/keeping_current_epstein.html [https://perma.cc/K9D9-
3TDV] (describing deals that were drastically altered or gridlocked because of ap-
praisal arbitrage).
51. See Onyeador, supra note 4, at 356 (suggesting arbitrage is antithetical to
appraisal rights because risk of appraisal causes merger price to decline, “stripping
value from long-term target stockholders and placing it in the hands of predatory
arbitrageurs”).  For a discussion of the legality of appraisal arbitrage, see Newell,
supra note 3, at 12 (explaining appraisal arbitrage “was first challenged 10 years
ago and found to comply with the statute”).  The Delaware Court of Chancery
originally found the investment strategy complied with Delaware’s appraisal statute
in 2007. See In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., No. Civ.A. 1554-CC,
2007 WL 1378345, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007) (approving legality of appraisal
arbitrage practice).
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C. I Want to Hold Your Hand: The Delaware Courts and Legislature Get
Together to Curb Appraisal Arbitrage
The number of appraisal cases in Delaware has spiked in the past dec-
ade.52  Part of this influx occurred because the Delaware Court of Chan-
cery consistently appraised the share value higher than the deal price,
increasing the profitability of the arbitrage practice.53  Recent years, how-
ever, have seen an increasing backlash against appraisal arbitrage.54  The
Court of Chancery has discouraged it by repeatedly capping the value of
the shares at the deal price unless there is reason to question the fairness
of the deal.55  Recently, the Court of Chancery has even broken the deal
52. See Korsmo, supra note 5, at 1553 (“Appraisal activity involving public com-
panies is undergoing explosive growth in Delaware, driven by sophisticated parties
who specialize in bringing appraisal claims” and showing tenfold increase in ap-
praisal claim value since 2004); Newell, supra note 3, at 12 (describing “exponen-
tial rise in appraisal filings in the last decade” attributable to appraisal arbitrage).
53. See Jiang, supra note 12, at 699 (demonstrating that appraisal litigation
accrues “an average (median) annualized return of 32.9 percent” on investment);
see also Boyd, supra note 38, at 498 (arguing that Transkaryotic encouraged arbitrage
by allowing shareholders who purchased after merger announcement to dissent).
54. See Daniel E. Meyer, Maybe Publius Was Right: Relying on Merger Price to Deter-
mine Fair Value in Delaware Appraisal Cases, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 153, 166-67 (2016)
(describing backlash and resistance against practice of appraisal arbitrage);
Onyeador, supra note 4, at 345–55 (describing backlash by corporate defense and
other backlash against arbitrage practice).  The backlash has in some cases been
extreme: when a hedge fund threatened the Dole Company with arbitrage, Dole in
turn threatened to reincorporate in a different state unless the legislature amends
the appraisal statute. See Onyeador, supra note 4, at 355 (describing corporate
reaction to arbitrage).
55. See Huff Fund Inv. P’ship v. CKx, Inc., Civil Action No. 6844-VCG, 2013
WL 5878807, at *11 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2013) (giving weight to deal price because
transaction was clean), aff’d, 2015 WL 631586 (Del. 2015).  The Huff case was the
first in the trend giving the greatest weight to the deal price in a clean transaction.
See Boyd, supra note 38, at 514 (explaining arbitrage case history).  For a further
discussion of cases in the Chancery Court following this trend of granting defer-
ence to merger price in clean transaction, compare In re PetSmart, Inc., C.A. No.
10782-VCS, 2017 WL 2303599, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 26, 2017) (setting fair value at
deal price because deal price was “‘forged in the crucible of objective market real-
ity’” and is therefore “the best indicator of the fair value of PetSmart as of the
closing of the Merger” (quoting Van de Walle v. Unimation, Inc., Civ. A. No. 7046,
1991 WL 29303, at *17 (Del. Ch. Mar. 7, 1991))), and Merion Capital L.P. v.
Lender Processing Servs., Inc., C.A. No. 9320-VCL, 2016 WL 7324170, at *26–33
(Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016) (finding deal price reflected fair value exactly), and Mer-
lin Partners LP v. AutoInfo, Inc., C.A. No. 8509-VCN, 2015 WL 2069417, at *12–14
(Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015) (adopting deal price because company was “‘shopped
quite a bit’” and sale was “at arm’s length, without compulsion, and with adequate
information”), and In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., Consolidated Civil Action
No. 8173-VCG, 2015 WL 399726, at *23–24 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015) (finding deal
price represented fair price), and Merion Capital L.P., 2016 WL 7324170, at *18
(adopting deal price because of bidding process that “created credible competi-
tion among heterogeneous bidders during the pre-signing phase”), with In re Dole
Food Co., C.A. No. 8703-VCL, 2017 WL 624843, at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2017)
(refusing deference to merger price when special committee was misinformed and
lacked negotiating power), and Dunmire v. Farmers & Merchs. Bancorp of W. Pa.,
Inc., C.A. No. 10589-CB, 2016 WL 6651411, at *7–8 (Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 2016) (de-
10
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price floor and appraised the shares at less than the deal price.56  Dela-
ware courts have, however, stopped short of creating a “presumption” that
the market value is the fair value.57  From the beginning of the appraisal
arbitrage practice, the courts have held that arbitrage is authorized by the
statute; therefore, it is the legislature, not the courts, who must ultimately
resolve the issue.58
Appraisal arbitrage became such a popular (and controversial) prac-
tice that in 2016, the Delaware legislature, in an attempt to reduce arbi-
trage, revised Section 262 in two important ways.59  First, it added a
clining deference to merger price when there was controlling shareholder and no
auction).
56. See In re Appraisal of AOL Inc., C.A. No. 11204-VCG, 2018 WL 1037450, at
*21 (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2018) (valuing shares at less than deal price); Verition Part-
ners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., C.A. No. 11448-VCL, 2018 WL
922139, at *30 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018) (valuing shares at trading price prior to
merger announcement); LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., C.A. No.
8094–VCP, 2015 WL 4540443, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015) (reducing merger
price by value of synergies related to acquisition, leading to valuation of shares
below merger price); see also Alison Frankel, New Chancery Court Opinion Shows Real
Risk for Arbitrageurs in Appraisal Litigation, REUTERS (June 1, 2017 4:34 PM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-appraisal/new-chancery-court-opinion-shows-real-
risk-for-arbitrageurs-in-appraisal-litigation-idUSKBN18S6F0 [https://perma.cc/
AH9P-SMLW] (noting Court of Chancery’s valuations at less than deal price).
57. See 1 F. HODGE O’NEILL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, 1 OPPRESSION OF MIN.
SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS § 5:45 (“While recognizing the price in an
arm’s-length negotiated merger is a strong indication of fair value, the Delaware
Supreme Court has said that such a price is not the overriding consideration
under its appraisal statute and does not need to be considered if unsupported by
evidence that it represents an accurate going concern value.” (citing M.P.M. Enter.
v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 796–97 (Del. 1999))); see also Chicago Corp. v. Munds,
172 A.452, 454 (Del. Ch. 1934) (describing Delaware’s rejection of New Jersey’s
“full market value” standard in favor of “value” standard, which rejects market’s
control of appraisal value); Newell, supra note 3, at 13–14 (describing recommen-
dations to Delaware General Assembly’s revision committees in support of aban-
doning appraisal for fair market value and General Assembly’s rejection of those
recommendations).  The Delaware legislature has made one important concession
to the market: in 1967, it added § 262(k), the “market out” provision that denied
appraisal when shareholders of public companies boasting at least 2,000 share-
holders were given stock-for-stock compensation. See id. (describing “market out”
provision).
58. See generally In re: Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., No. Civ.A.
1554–CC, 2007 WL 1378345, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007) (“To the extent that this
concern [over appraisal arbitrage] has validity, relief more properly lies with the
Legislature. . . .  The Legislature, not this Court, possesses the power to modify
§ 262 to avoid the evil [of appraisal arbitrage], if it is an evil. . . .”). Transkaryotic
shows that the tension between legislative and judicial resolution of the issue has
existed since appraisal arbitrage first became a practice. See id. (advocating for
judicial resolution).
59. See Jiang, supra note 12, at 699 (explaining dual revisions to § 262 ap-
praisal statute).  Jiang’s empirical study suggests the Delaware legislative amend-
ments have been successful not only in reducing arbitrage in general but in
targeting and eliminating strike suits. See id. at 700 (“[T]he Delaware statutory
reforms will significantly reduce the number of small appraisal cases filed, which
are the cases most likely to constitute strike suits. . . .”).  Meanwhile, the amend-
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minimum share ownership requirement before the owner could seek ap-
praisal.60  Second, it allowed the surviving corporation to prepay the dis-
senting shareholders the deal price and thus avoid the bulk of interest
payments that make arbitrage a predictably profitable endeavor.61  To-
gether, these revisions “starve” the practice by (1) ensuring that investors
own a sufficiently large block of shares to make the litigation worthwhile,
and (2) discouraging investors from suing for appraisal when a company
can “prepay” for the dissenting shares and thus avoid interest charges.62
Given the legislature’s discouragement of the practice and the trend
in the Court of Chancery to limit appraisal at the deal price, the Delaware
Supreme Court was primed to weigh in on the issue.63  It did so in DFC
ment has preserved arbitrage in the settings where it can do the most good. See id.
(“However, these statutory changes should not affect the agency-cost-reduction ef-
fects of appraisal: these cases target transactions with higher indicia of managerial
conflicts of interest and result in some large verdicts in favor of plaintiffs in big
cases.”).  Given these effects, Jiang concludes that “the revised Delaware appraisal
statute should have a positive role as a shareholder remedy.” Id. (evaluating Dela-
ware statutory revisions). But see Onyeador, supra note 4, at 357 (suggesting the
amendments are “insufficient” and may inadvertently make appraisal remedy avail-
able only to hedge funds and other major investors).
60. See Jiang, supra note 12, at 699 (describing “de minimis exception”).  As
Jiang describes the legislative amendment, “the law now requires petitioners to
collectively hold a minimum stake of $1 million in, or 1 percent of, the outstand-
ing stock of the company for which the petitioner is seeking appraisal. . . .” Id.
(same).  Some believe the de minimis requirement “may impair the appraisal
rights of those stockholders who do qualify” because only shareholders with a sub-
stantial stake, such as hedge funds and activist investors, will meet the require-
ment. See Allen, supra note 43, at 762 (speculating on effect of statutory revisions).
The de minimis requirement may also be advantageous to corporations because
the corporation can “settle with a subset of stockholders until the threshold is no
longer met, causing dismissal of the remaining dissenter’s appraisal petitions.” Id.
(describing possible negative effects of legislative amendment).
61. See Jiang, supra note 12, at 699 (describing interest prepayment revision).
Jiang outlines the interest provision amendment: “companies [may] reduce the
amount of statutory prejudgment interest they pay on awards in an appraisal pro-
ceeding by tendering some or all of the merger consideration to the appraisal
plaintiff early in the litigation. . . .” Id. (same); see also Onyeador, supra note 4, at
358 (noting that “lucrative 12%” average interest rate “incentiviz[es] arbitrageurs
to continue targeting fair transactions despite low probabilities of getting a higher
judicially awarded premium”).
62. See Jiang, supra note 12, at 700 (evaluating effects of legislative amend-
ments to appraisal statute).  Jiang’s study suggests the legislative amendment to
§ 262(h) will be an effective curb on appraisal arbitrage. See id. (finding “the
amendment is likely to significantly reduce the motive for seeking appraisal,” and
finding that “Delaware’s reforms [are] a way of discouraging strike suits and inter-
est-rate-driven appraisal cases”). But see Onyeador, supra note 4, at 358 (arguing
that interest prepayment “may perversely encourage arbitrage activity” because it
funds arbitrageur’s appraisal proceeding, allowing arbitrageur to bring appraisal
suit without attendant liquidity and funding hardships).
63. See generally Steve Hecht, Delaware Supreme Court Decides DFC Global Appeal,
LOWENSTEIN SANDLER APPRAISAL RIGHTS LITIGATION BLOG (Aug. 1, 2017), https://
www.appraisalrightslitigation.com/2017/08/01/delaware-supreme-court-decides-
dfc-global-appeal/ [https://perma.cc/S24H-8N8C] (describing DFC Global as
“highly watched” because of its likely effect upon appraisal arbitrage industry).
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Global, answering two salient questions.64  First, what will the judiciary’s
role be in the legislative attempt to curb the practice?65  Second, if the
court wishes to discourage arbitrage, how can it do so without taking away
the dissenting shareholder rights that Section 262 was designed to
protect?66
III. BABY YOU’RE A RICH MAN: THE COURT OF CHANCERY AWARDS
ARBITRAGEURS A HIGHER PRICE IN IN RE APPRAISAL OF DFC
GLOBAL CORPORATION, AND THE DELAWARE
SUPREME COURT REVERSES
In 2014, Lone Star Capital purchased DFC Global for $9.50 per share,
and several dissenting shareholders sued for appraisal.67  The Court of
Chancery found three factors relevant in determining a fair price for the
shares: (1) a discounted cash flow valuation, (2) a comparable companies
analysis, and (3) the deal price.68  The Court of Chancery weighed these
three factors equally and determined a fair appraisal price of $10.21.69
Both parties appealed.70  On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court held
that the Court of Chancery did not give sufficient weight to the deal
price.71  It found the Court of Chancery had inflated the future value of
DFC Global without support from the record.72  It also found that the
The Delaware Supreme Court has already returned to the appraisal arbitrage issue
since DFC Global, reaffirming the importance of deal price even in management
led buyouts in Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd, 177 A.3d 1,
44 (Del. 2017) (remanding to Court of Chancery to give greater weight to deal
price).
64. See Gail Weinstein & Scott Luftglass, DFC Global: Delaware Supreme Court
Strongly Endorses Reliance on Merger Price, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERN-
ANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 4, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/08/04/
dfc-global-delaware-supreme-court-strongly-endorses-reliance-on-merger-price/
[https://perma.cc/4F99-BRGR] (addressing questions answered and left unan-
swered by DFC Global opinion).
65. For a discussion of DFC Global’s effect on the court’s role in curbing arbi-
trage, see infra notes 143–56 and accompanying text.
66. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s preservation of appraisal, see in-
fra notes 143–56 and accompanying text.
67. See In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp., C.A. No. 10107-CB, 2016 WL
3753123, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2016) (describing purchase of DFC Global Corpo-
ration), rev’d sub nom. DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d
346 (Del. 2017).
68. See id. at *5 (describing factors Court of Chancery considers in appraisal
evaluation).
69. See id. at *23 (concluding $10.21 constituted fair value of shares).
70. See DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 348 (Del.
2017) (noting parties’ cross-appeals).
71. See id. at 366 (concluding Court of Chancery gave insufficient weight to
deal price).
72. See id. at 375–85 (finding Court of Chancery’s conclusions unsupported
by record).
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Court of Chancery properly used a comparable companies analysis.73  Fi-
nally, it found that the Court of Chancery had failed to explain why it
weighted each factor in its appraisal equally.74  Ultimately, the Delaware
Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new appraisal of the fair
value of DFC Global’s shares.75
A. Money Can’t Buy Me Love: The Sale of a Troubled Payday Lending
Company
DFC Global is a payday lender.76  In 2012, DFC Global engaged Hou-
lihan Lokey Capital to search for a potential buyer.77  The future of DFC
Global was uncertain: increased regulatory restrictions threatened to de-
crease profits, the company was highly leveraged, and leadership was un-
certain.78  In 2013, the company began to suffer from increased
regulations in the financial industry in the U.K. and Canada, as well as
impending regulatory restrictions in the U.S.79  Houlihan Lokey Capital
searched diligently for a buyer for two years, and though it engaged the
interest of multiple companies, most declined to make an offer because of
the uncertain regulatory future and the company’s highly leveraged sta-
tus.80  DFC Global ultimately received two offers: one from Lone Star Cap-
ital, who made a nonbinding offer of $12.16 per share, and the other from
J.C. Flowers & Co, LLC, who made a nonbinding offer of $13.50 per
share.81
Following these offers, DFC Global’s efforts at compliance with the
new and impending regulations caused its stock prices and earnings pro-
jections to fall precipitously starting in early 2014.82  J.C. Flowers & Co.
withdrew its bid.83  As DFC revised its earnings projections downward,
Lone Star Capital correspondingly lowered its offer, until it made a final
offer in late March 2014 of $9.50 per share.84  DFC Global accepted this
73. See id. at 386–87 (approving Court of Chancery’s use of comparable com-
panies analysis).
74. See id. at 388 (requiring Court of Chancery to give rationale for weight
attributed to factors and finding it failed to do so).
75. See id. at 388–89 (reversing and remanding for new appraisal).
76. See In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp., No. CV 10107-CB, 2016 WL
3753123, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2016) (“DFC’s business focuses on alternative con-
sumer financial services, colloquially known as payday lending.”), rev’d sub nom.
DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017).
77. See id. at *3 (describing origination of sales process).
78. See id. at *2–3 (describing uncertainty of DFC Global Corporation’s
future).
79. See id. (describing regulatory restriction and effects on DFC Global
Corporation).
80. See id. (describing initial search for buyer).
81. See id. at *4 (describing initial nonbinding offers).
82. See id. (describing falling prospective value of company).
83. See id. (describing withdrawal of offer).
84. See id. (describing Lone Star Capital’s declining offer price).
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offer, and the merger finalized.85  However, several shareholders dis-
sented from that finalized merger.86  Shortly after the transaction closed
in June 2014, these dissenting shareholders filed for appraisal under Sec-
tion 262 of the Delaware Code.87
B. You Keep All Your Money in a Big Brown Bag: The Court of Chancery’s
Appraisal Action and Appeal
The Court of Chancery found that the parties should be granted ap-
praisal under Section 262 of the Delaware Code.88  In the ensuing ap-
praisal litigation, the parties presented different methods of appraising
the shares, resulting in greatly disparate values.89  The dissenting share-
holders relied exclusively on the discounted cash flow model to appraise
the share value at $17.90 per share.90  DFC Global relied on the dis-
counted cash flow model, a comparable companies analysis, and the deal
price to appraise the share value at $7.94 per share.91
The Court of Chancery combined three valuation methods to ap-
praise the fair value of the DFC Global shares at $10.21.92  First, it em-
barked on its own discounted cash flow model, utilizing various elements
from each party’s expert, to reach a share value of $13.07.93  Second, it
adopted DFC Global’s comparable companies analysis, which valued DFC
Global’s shares at $8.07.94  Third, it included the deal price as a factor.95
85. See id. (describing finalization of merger).
86. See id. at *1 (describing dissenting shareholders).  The dissenting share-
holders collectively owned 4,604,683 shares in DFC Global. See id. (describing dis-
senting shareholders stake in company).  These shareholders were hedge funds—
Muirfield Value Partners, LP, Candlewood Special Situations Master Fund, Ltd.,
CWD OC 522 Master Fund, Ltd., and Oasis Investments II Master Fund Ltd.—
suggesting the dissenting action was classic appraisal arbitrage.  See id. (identifying
dissenting shareholders seeking appraisal).
87. See id. at *5 (describing appraisal action filed by dissenting shareholders).
88. See id. (granting appraisal remedy).
89. See id. (outlining parties’ valuation methods and results).
90. See id. at *6 (reviewing dissenting shareholder’s valuation methodology).
91. See id. at *6 (reviewing DFC Global’s valuation methodology).  As the
Court of Chancery noted, the parties’ disparate valuation methods create a gap
between the appraisals of $10.09, which is larger than the deal price itself. See id.
(noting disparity in parties’ expert valuations).
92. See id. at *23 (establishing final appraisal value).
93. See id. at *6–19 (describing court’s discounted cash flow analysis using
elements from each party’s expert).  Discounted Cash Flow analysis, or DCF, values
a company based on the present value of its future cash flow projections. See Dis-
counted Cash Flow Definition, WALL STREET OASIS, https://www.wallstreetoasis.com/
finance-dictionary/what-is-a-discounted-cash-flow-DCF [https://perma.cc/HH8B-
KSGQ] (defining discounted cash flow analysis).
94. See id. at *19–20 (describing court’s adoption of comparable companies
analysis).  A comparable companies analysis creates a “peer group” of similar com-
panies and values the company based on an averaging of those companies’ valua-
tions. See id. (describing method for comparable companies analysis).
95. See id. at *20–21 (including deal price as factor in valuation).  The deal
price is the simplest valuation method: it plainly adopts the market’s valuation as
15
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The Court of Chancery found the deal price could not be given exclusive
weight because (1) DFC Global was navigating turbulent regulatory issues
at the time of the sale, which may have obscured its true future value and
(2) Lone Star Capital was a financial sponsor rather than a business opera-
tor, and may have based its offer price on “achieving a certain internal rate
of return and on reaching a deal within its financing constraints, rather
than on DFC’s fair value.”96  The Court of Chancery gave each appraisal
method equal weight.97  On appeal from both parties, the Delaware Su-
preme Court reversed the Court of Chancery and remanded for a new
appraisal.98
C. You Never Give Me Your Money: The Delaware Supreme Court Finds Deal
Price Deserves More Weight
The Delaware Supreme Court began by reviewing the gloomy land-
scape for DFC Global surrounding the sale.99  It noted that DFC Global
had experienced explosive growth over the last twenty years, but had
shrunk in the years leading up to the sale.100  In addition, DFC Global was
highly leveraged with a debt load almost four times its equity.101  Also, the
company faced “regulatory headwinds” that rendered the future uncer-
tain.102  The court also noted further negative signs surrounding the sale
itself.103  For instance, DFC Global had tried to refinance some of its se-
nior debt and failed because its credit rating had recently been down-
represented by the price offered and accepted for the sale of the company. See id.
(describing deal price as valuation method).
96. See id. at *22 (offering reasons for declining to give deal price prevalent
weight).
97. See id. at *21 (dividing weight equally among three factors).  As the Court
of Chancery pointed out, Delaware has used multiple factors to determine a fair
appraisal price in the past. See id. n.235 (identifying various appraisal factors used
by Delaware courts).  The court cites Hanover Direct, Inc. S’holders Litig., Civil Action
Nos. 1969–CC, 3047–CC, 3291–CC, 2010 WL 3959399, at *2–3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 24,
2010) (adopting valuation of expert who applied multiple valuation techniques,
noting that Court has more confidence in accuracy of multiple valuation methods
when results support each other, and criticizing other expert’s use of only one
technique rather than blend of valuation methods) and Andaloro v. PFPC World-
wide, Inc., No. Civ.A. 20336, Civ.A. 20289, 2005 WL 2045640, at *20 (Del. Ch. Aug.
19, 2005) (attributing 75% weight to discounted cash flow because management
projections were reliable, and 25% weight to comparable companies analysis be-
cause of good peer group and benefit of additional insight provided by approach).
98. See DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 388–89
(Del. 2017) (reversing and remanding Court of Chancery).
99. See id. at 353–54 (describing leveraged status of DFC Global Corporation
and regulatory headwinds that created bleak business future).
100. See id. at 351–53 (tracking DFC Global Corporation’s historic growth
rates).
101. See id. at 353 (noting DFC Global Corporation’s debt problems).
102. See id. at 353–54 (noting presence of potentially upsetting regulations
before merger).
103. See id. at 355–56 (noting negative financial indicators related to sale).
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graded.104  Leading up to the sale, DFC Global had revised its projected
earnings downward each month, but despite these revisions, the company
still failed to meet its target earnings after the sale.105
After summarizing the Court of Chancery’s appraisal, the Delaware
Supreme Court moved to the parties’ cross-appeals.106  DFC Global raised
three issues on appeal.107  First, it asked the court to adopt a “judicial pre-
sumption” setting the appraisal at the deal price where there was a robust
sale process in an arm’s-length transaction (i.e. a clean merger).108  Sec-
ond, absent a judicial presumption, DFC Global argued the Court of
Chancery gave insufficient weight to the deal price.109  Third, DFC Global
argued the Court of Chancery made errors of assumption in its discounted
cash flow analysis.110  On cross-appeal, the dissenting shareholders argued
the Court of Chancery should not have given weight to a comparable com-
panies analysis and should have relied exclusively on the discounted cash
flow analysis.111  Finally, the Delaware Supreme Court itself raised the “im-
plied argument” that the Court of Chancery lacked a rationale for giving
all three factors in the appraisal equal weight.112
The Delaware Supreme Court denied DFC Global’s first appeal argu-
ing for a “judicial presumption” of the deal price because creating a pre-
sumption would contravene the clear statutory language in Delaware’s
104. See id. (noting credit downgrading leading up to sale).
105. See id. (noting failure to meet income projections).
106. See id. at 357–61 (summarizing Court of Chancery appraisal).
107. See id. at 362–63 (introducing DFC Global’s three appeal issues).
108. See id. at 362 (describing DFC Global’s argument that presumption be
given to deal price “in appraisal cases where the transaction was the product of
certain market conditions”).  Additionally, as the Supreme Court noted, “DFC ar-
gues that those conditions pertain to this case and the Court of Chancery erred by
not giving presumptive and exclusive weight to the deal price.” Id. (acknowledg-
ing DFC Global’s argument for presumptive fairness of deal price).
109. See id. (describing DFC’s “more case-specific” appeal arguing Court of
Chancery’s reasons for diminishing weight given to deal price “not rationally sup-
ported by the record”).
110. See id. at 362–63 (describing DFC Global’s appeal regarding Court of
Chancery’s discounted cash flow analysis).  DFC Global’s appeal on this point re-
garded the re-argument after the original Court of Chancery appraisal trial. See id.
(describing post-trial re-argument).  During that re-argument, the Court of Chan-
cery admitted a clerical error that revised its discounted cash flow model from well
above the deal price—$13.07—to well below—$.7.70. See id. at 361–62 (identify-
ing clerical error in valuation).  The Court of Chancery, however, also revised its
estimation of the working capital available to DFC, and as a result revised its pro-
jections of future profits upward so that its discounted cash flow analysis ultimately
returned to almost exactly its previous level. See id. (describing Court of Chan-
cery’s revision of other factors in valuation).
111. See id. at 362–63 (describing petitioners’ cross-appeal).
112. See id. at 363 (noting that “DFC’s overall argument raises another im-
plied argument, which is that the Court of Chancery’s decision to afford equal
weight to the [three factors] was arbitrary and not based on any reasoned explana-
tion of why that weighting was appropriate”).
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appraisal statute.113  The court noted it had already rejected this judicial
presumption in Golden Telecom Inc. v. Global GT LP,114 finding in that case
that Delaware’s appraisal statute allowed the Court of Chancery to use its
discretion and entertain “all relevant factors” in determining a fair
price.115  Creating a judicial presumption would also require the court to
“craft . . . the precise pre-conditions that would be necessary to invoke a
presumption of that kind.”116  Creating these pre-conditions, however,
would create a rigid framework that might prevent judicial discretion in
the instances when it would be needed most.117  Finally, the court held
there is no need for a judicial presumption because the Court of Chancery
has shown that in clean transactions, it already gives great deference to the
deal price, rendering an explicit presumption unnecessary.118
The high court in Delaware granted DFC Global’s second appeal,
holding that the deal price should have been given greater weight in the
113. See id. (rejecting judicial presumption because presumption would go
against § 262, which requires judges to consider “all relevant factors” in appraisal
trial).
114. 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010).
115. See DFC Glob. Corp., 172 A.3d at 363–64 (explaining reasoning in Golden
Telecom).  The court noted the key statutory provision is found in § 262(h):
Through such proceeding the Court shall determine the fair value of the
shares exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment
or expectation of the merger or consolidation, together with interest, if
any, to be paid upon the amount determined to be the fair value. In
determining such fair value, the Court shall take into account all relevant
factors.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 262(h) (requiring Court of Chancery to account for all
relevant factors) (emphasis added).  In Golden Telecom, the Delaware Supreme
Court found § 262(h) “unambiguously calls upon the Court of Chancery to per-
form an independent evaluation of ‘fair value’” and “vests the Chancellor and Vice
Chancellors with significant discretion to consider ‘all relevant factors’ and deter-
mine the going concern value of the underlying company.”  Golden Telecom Inc., 11
A.3d at 217–18 (describing statutory requirements for evaluation in § 262(h)).
Given this statutory mandate, requiring the Court of Chancery to defer to the deal
price “would inappropriately shift the responsibility to determine ‘fair value’ from
the court to the private parties.” Id. (assessing appropriateness of presumption for
deal price).  Rejecting a judicial presumption is necessary to preserve the judicial
discretion the statute specifically authorizes. See id. (explaining rejection of judi-
cial presumption for deal price).
116. See DFC Glob. Corp., 172 A.3d at 366 (highlighting that creation of pre-
sumption of deal price as fair value would require court to outline in detail what
conditions sale must meet to invoke presumption).  The Delaware Supreme
Court’s underlying thrust in rejecting a presumption is that this is work for the
legislature, not the judiciary. See id. (“DFC would have us put a judicial gloss on
the broad ‘all relevant factors’ language . . . [w]e do not, however, view the statu-
tory language as inviting us to do so.”).
117. See id. (warning against hazards of creating judicial presumption).
118. See id. (explaining there is no need for presumption because of “the
proven record of our Court of Chancery in exercising its discretion to give the deal
price predominant, and indeed exclusive weight, when it determines, based on the
precise facts before it that led to the transaction, that the deal price is the most
reliable evidence of fair value.” (emphasis added)).
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appraisal.119  The court spent its greatest focus on this issue.120  It indi-
cated in clear terms that when there is a robust sale process and the sale is
free of the suspicion of self-dealing—as was the case in the DFC Global
sale—”[w]e can take the market’s word for it.”121  The court pointed out
that the DFC Global sale was particularly poised to receive a fair market
price: it was a publicly traded company, it was actively traded, it was ac-
tively examined by debt markets and credit agencies, and during the sale
process “numerous strategic and financial buyers” were given access to
privileged company information to make their assessments and offers.122
In diminishing the weight it gave to the deal price, the Court of Chan-
cery relied on two factors, which the Delaware Supreme Court rejected.123
First, the Court of Chancery found that DFC Global had been underval-
ued because regulatory concerns had put it in a “trough” from which it
might successfully emerge.124  The Delaware Supreme Court found the
market had already accounted for this possibility in the sale price.125  Sec-
ond, the Court of Chancery held that because the purchaser, Lone Star
119. See id. at 376. (agreeing with DFC Global’s argument on appeal that
Court of Chancery should have given deal price greater weight).
120. See id. at 366–76 (addressing weight given to deal price).  With almost
ten pages dedicated to addressing this appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court af-
fords it nearly as much space as the other four appeal issues combined. See id. at
363–88 (emphasizing importance of appeal regarding deference to deal price).
121. See id. at 370 (emphasizing fairness of market price (quoting RICHARD A.
BREALEY, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 214 (9th ed. 2008)).  The Delaware
Supreme Court strongly emphasizes the trustworthiness of the market: while the
deal price may not always be right, a Court of Chancery judge “should have little
confidence she can be the special one able to outwit the larger universe of equally
avid capitalists with an incentive to reap rewards by buying the asset if it is too
cheaply priced.” See id. at 367 (addressing proper weight to give to deal price).
Further, in a fair, arm’s-length bidding process, “the resulting collective judgment
as to value is likely to be highly informative and that, all estimators having equal
access to information, the likelihood of outguessing the market over time and
building a portfolio of stocks beating it is slight.” See id. at 370 (indicating com-
pleteness of market price).
122. See id. at 372 (describing factors accounting for trustworthy fair market
sale price).
123. See id. (describing Court of Chancery’s factors for lack of deference to
deal price).
124. See id. at 372–75 (explaining Court of Chancery’s reasoning in holding
DFC Global to be undervalued in sale).
125. See id. (positing that market already accounted for regulatory risks in sale
price).  The Delaware Supreme Court’s rebuttal to the Court of Chancery’s argu-
ment is that risk is a part of value: given the facts surrounding the sale, DFC Global
seemed to have an equal chance of either emerging from the new regulations as
the industry leader or ceasing to be a going concern. See id. (evaluating DFC
Global’s future prospects).  The market observed the same company potential as
the Court of Chancery and, based on numerous factors, did not accept DFC
Global’s “growth story.” See id. at 375 (explaining market’s reasoning in deal
price).  This did not mean, as the Court of Chancery suggested, that the market
ignored these risk factors; rather, “the record demonstrates that the markets fac-
tored regulatory risk into DFC’s pricing.” See id. (describing effect of regulatory
risks on market price).
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Capital, was a private equity firm, it purchased DFC Global based on finan-
cial reasons—to meet a required rate of return—rather than on strategic
reasons, and strategic reasons may have given greater value to the com-
pany’s potential.126  The Delaware Supreme Court also rejected this factor
because “all disciplined buyers,” whether companies or financiers, have
required rates of return, and without evidence of an unfair deal, the moti-
vation for purchase should not affect the valuation.127
The Delaware Supreme Court granted DFC Global’s third appeal,
which argued that the Court of Chancery had erred in its discounted cash
flow analysis, because the record did not support a rapid growth predic-
tion for the company.128  The Court of Chancery assumed DFC Global
would expand at a rate significantly higher than ordinary mature, stable
companies.129  The Delaware Supreme Court found the Court of Chan-
cery accepted DFC Global’s “unbroken, sunny sky assumptions” about the
company’s future without support from the record.130  DFC Global’s pro-
jections for its future were suspect, and economic principles cast serious
doubt on the ability of any company to sustain the growth the Court of
Chancery credited to DFC Global’s future.131
126. See id. at 375–76 (explaining Court of Chancery’s reasoning regarding its
second factor in lack of deference to deal price).
127. See id. (rejecting Court of Chancery’s contention that Lone Star’s status
as private equity firm caused it to undervalue DFC Global).  The Delaware Su-
preme Court pointed out that the fair deal price was especially evident in the case
of DFC Global because of several reasons:
i) there was no conflict of interest; ii) Houlihan had approached every
logical buyer; iii) no one was willing to bid more in the months leading
up to the transaction before management significantly adjusted down-
ward its projections; and iv) management continued to miss its targets
after Lone Star was the only buyer remaining.
Id. at 376 (noting aspects of clean merger in DFC Global sale process).
128. See id. at 376–85 (rejecting Court of Chancery’s assumptions in its dis-
counted cash flow analysis).
129. See id. at 377–78 (summarizing Court of Chancery’s upward revisions of
its “perpetuity growth rate”).
130. See id. at 378 (finding Court of Chancery’s assumptions about DFC’s fu-
ture earnings not supported by record).  The Supreme Court found that “despite
. . . risks and rather gloomy outlook [for DFC Global], the Court of Chancery
swallowed the March Projections whole, generously giving DFC credit for a period
of projected growth until 2018.” See id. at 382–83 (evaluating Court of Chancery’s
valuation methodology).
131. See id. at 381–85 (disagreeing with Court of Chancery’s assumptions
about DFC Global’s future potential).  The Delaware Supreme Court named five
factors that discredit the growth rates the Court of Chancery used in its discounted
cash flow analysis: (1) the growth rates were being used by DFC in an attempt to
sell the company, and so they were too optimistic; (2) DFC had experienced nearly
20 years of rapid growth, and then stabilized and shrunk in the years prior to the
sale, indicating it had reached maturity; (3) the future growth was not grounded in
any testimony; (4) the regulatory pushback against the entire payday lending in-
dustry suggested that growth could never be sustained at previous rates; and (5)
the dissenting shareholders’ own expert testified that DFC had reached a stable
growth rate. See id. (explaining factors on record contrary to Court of Chancery’s
evaluation of potential future growth).
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The Delaware Supreme Court denied the dissenting shareholders’ ap-
peal because it found allowing a comparable companies analysis was rea-
sonable.132  The dissenting shareholders argued that DFC Global, unlike
comparable companies, was poised to take market control, and therefore
comparing it to other companies’ values detracted from its market poten-
tial.133  The Delaware Supreme Court rejected this argument because al-
though DFC had potential for growth, it also had potential for collapse
under regulatory pressure—these balanced risks provided no reason to
value it higher than similar, competing companies.134  The Delaware Su-
preme Court also found the Court of Chancery was right not to rely exclu-
sively on the discounted cash flow analysis.135
Finally, the Delaware Supreme Court granted DFC Global’s “implied
argument” that the Court of Chancery was required to offer a rationale for
the weight it gave each factor in the appraisal.136  The court found that
not only the valuation methods, but the weight accorded to each must be
grounded in the record.137  The court reiterated that there was no pre-
sumption of how to weigh factors, and the Court of Chancery was obli-
gated to exercise its discretion in doing so.138
132. See id. at 386–88 (addressing petitioners’ cross-appeal).
133. See id. at 386 (summarizing petitioners’ first argument in cross-appeal).
134. See id. at 386–87 (explaining reasons for rejecting cross-appeal).  The dis-
senting shareholders’ arguments were threefold: (1) the Court of Chancery relied
on “trough years,” or bad earning years to compare DFC Global’s earnings to com-
peting companies; (2) the results would have been different if a single year rather
than a spread had been used; and (3) the companies used in the comparable com-
panies analysis were not comparable to DFC Global. See id. (explaining dissenting
shareholders’ arguments for higher valuation price).  The Delaware Supreme
Court rejected all these arguments, finding there was no evidence that DFC Global
was primed for a surge in growth, that a spread of years was more reasonable than
a single year’s comparison, and that the dissenting shareholders’ own expert had
compared DFC Global to the same six companies as DFC Global’s expert. See id. at
386–88 (rejecting petitioners’ arguments and approving comparable companies
analysis).
135. See id. at 388 (finding no abuse of discretion in Court of Chancery for
relying on multiple valuation methods).  Given the large disparity yielded by the
discounted cash flow models used by the two parties’ experts and given the inher-
ent instability of that method of valuation, the Delaware Supreme Court reasoned
that using such a method exclusively would have been improper. See id. (rejecting
dissenting shareholders’ argument that discounted cash flow analysis should have
been sole valuation method).
136. See id. at 388 (addressing “implied argument” that Court of Chancery was
required to offer rationale for weight accorded to each valuation method).
137. See id. (finding weight granted each method must be grounded in record
and explained).
138. See id. at 388–89 (holding Court of Chancery had discretion in weighing
appraisal factors).  The Delaware Supreme Court blocked a “back door” judicial
presumption in this instance that would have allowed the Court of Chancery dis-
cretion in selecting appraisal factors but enforced a presumption regarding the
weight to accord to each. See id. at 388 (“[I]n keeping with our refusal to establish
a ‘presumption’ in favor of the deal price because of the statute’s broad mandate,
we also conclude that the Court of Chancery must exercise its considerable discre-
tion” in weighing factors).
21
Schneider: Get Back: The Delaware Supreme Court Discourages Appraisal Arbitr
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
744 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63: p. 723
In summary, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the Court of
Chancery needed to give additional weight to the deal price, and indi-
cated that under fair market conditions, in an arm’s-length sale, the mar-
ket truly can account for nearly every factor, requiring strong evidence to
find the deal price unfair.139  Despite this strong deference to the deal
price, the Supreme Court declined to establish a presumption that the
deal price must be the appraisal price in a clean transaction.140  Although
it found the Court of Chancery’s calculations unsupported by the record,
the Delaware Supreme Court did not prohibit the Court of Chancery from
entertaining other factors besides the deal price on remand.141  By revers-
ing and remanding, the Delaware Supreme Court ensured the Court of
Chancery would give additional weight to the deal price, and that it would
fully explain the weight it gave each factor in its new reappraisal.142
IV. FIXING A HOLE: DFC GLOBAL HELPS REHABILITATE THE DELAWARE
APPRAISAL STATUTE
By reversing and remanding the Court of Chancery, the Delaware Su-
preme Court accomplished three important goals that will help contain
the practice of appraisal arbitrage.143  First, it followed the legislature’s
clear intent to curb arbitrage in clean transactions.144  Second, it pre-
served judicial discretion to appraise at a value other than the deal price, a
discretion not only required by the statute but also necessary for the
court’s ability to vindicate minority shareholder rights.145  Third, it sent a
clear message to arbitrageurs that the practice will not be given a warm
welcome in clean mergers.146
139. For an in-depth discussion of the Supreme Court’s holding regarding
the weight to be given the deal price, see supra notes 119–22 and accompanying
text.
140. For an in-depth discussion of the Supreme Court’s rejection of a judicial
presumption in favor of the deal price, see supra notes 113–18 and accompanying
text.
141. For an in-depth discussion of the Delaware Supreme Court’s allowance
of a comparable company analysis and the discounted cash flow analysis as ap-
praisal valuation techniques, see supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text.
142. See DFC Glob. Corp., 172 A.3d at 388–89 (remanding to Court of Chan-
cery).  The Delaware Supreme Court stated the remand was for “the Chancellor to
reassess his conclusion as to fair value in light of our decision,” and that it would
“leave the Chancellor with the discretion to address the open issues using proce-
dures he finds the most helpful.”  See id. at 389 (providing instructions for ap-
praisal on remand).
143. See Weinstein, supra note 64 (describing limiting effect of DFC Global).
144. See Onyeador, supra note 4, at 357 (identifying amendments to § 262 as
legislature’s “effort to curb appraisal arbitrage.”).
145. See DFC Glob. Corp., 172 A.3d at 363–66 (declining to adopt judicial pre-
sumption that market price in clean merger is fair value).
146. For an in-depth discussion of the effect of the DFC Global opinion on
practitioners, see infra notes 156–74 and accompanying text.
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A. Power to the People: The Delaware Supreme Court Follows the Legislature’s
Lead While Preserving Judicial Discretion in Appraisal Rights
The DFC Global opinion effectively furthers the legislature’s intent in
its amendments to Section 262.147  The legislative amendments of 2016
will likely reduce arbitrage cases that constitute strike suits.148 DFC Global
has the same effect; it virtually ensures an arbitrageur will be unable to
bring shares from a clean transaction to the court and profit from a higher
appraisal.149  Though the opinion does not limit arbitrage in any other
merger context, this is a severe blow to the practice because the great ma-
jority of arbitrage claims are filed in clean mergers.150
Because appraisal arbitrage generates money through both the judi-
cial appraisal award and the statutory interest earned on that award, the
courts and the legislature both have power over the practice—in order for
any effort to stymie arbitrage to succeed, both these branches of govern-
ment must cooperate.151  In this case, they have done so, allowing the judi-
ciary to maintain its discretion and allowing the legislature to avoid
legislation that could unnecessarily and harmfully limit shareholder ap-
praisal rights.152
By declining to create a judicial presumption that the deal price is the
fair value in a clean merger, the Supreme Court avoided the pitfalls of
legislating from the bench.153  Creating a judicial presumption would, as
the court noted, require it to state in detail the criteria for meeting that
147. See Allen, supra note 43, at 761 (describing legislative intent of amend-
ments to § 262).
148. See Jiang, supra note 12, at 727 (“[B]oth the de minimis exception and
the interest reduction amendment reforms . . . are very likely to reduce the inci-
dence of strike suits.”).
149. See DFC Glob. Corp., 172 A.3d at 370–71 (emphasizing importance and
trustworthiness of deal price).  The Delaware Supreme Court emphasized the
trustworthiness of the deal price even more in a subsequent case, where it gave
“the vice chancellor the discretion on remand to enter judgment at the deal price
if he so chooses, with no further proceedings.”  See Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob.
Event Driven Master Fund Ltd, No. 565, 2016, 2017 WL 6375829, at *34 (Del. Dec.
14, 2017) (giving instructions for remand).
150. See Kesten, supra note 7, at 92 (“[O]ver 93% of appraisal petitions filed
against public companies during 2015 and 2016 challenged arm’s length
transactions.”).
151. See Meyer, supra note 54, at 192 (arguing both Court of Chancery and
legislature have role in reforming appraisal litigation).  Meyer argues that the
Court of Chancery is “better suited to solve this problem than the legislature is,”
because deferring to the merger price, which is the court’s prerogative, “has the
institutional capacity to deter these unwanted, speculative, and potentially abusive
appraisal claims,” while the effect of the legislative amendments will be limited. See
id. (describing role of government branches in preventing meritless arbitrage).
152. For a further discussion of the restrictive effects of the legislative amend-
ments, including an argument that it may be a detriment to shareholder rights, see
supra note 60.
153. See DFC Glob. Corp., 172 A.3d at 348 (declining to adopt judicial presump-
tion because presumption “has no basis in the statutory text” and therefore “until
the General Assembly wishes to narrow the prism through which the Court of
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presumption.154  A court cannot foresee all possible future cases, and DFC
Global allows for the possibility that an otherwise clean merger might con-
tain extraordinary facts that require a fair value different from the deal
price.155
B. The Long and Winding Road: Attorneys Should Understand that Appraisal
Arbitrage is Being Starved in Clean Mergers
Attorneys representing arbitrageurs should understand the risks of
exercising appraisal rights in a clean merger.156  Arbitrage no longer “re-
sembles buying a lottery ticket with a guaranteed minimum payout equal
to the purchase price.”157  The risks for any client in a clean merger are
now heightened because outside of extraordinary circumstances, the
Court of Chancery will not appraise fair value above the deal price.158
Even if it does, there is now strong Delaware Supreme Court precedent to
reverse such an appraisal.159  Combined with the ability of the surviving
corporation to avoid interest payments, any appraisal filed in a clean
merger runs the risk of racking up fees and costs that will turn the invest-
ment into a loss for the client.160  A still more dismal prospect is that the
Court of Chancery will appraise at less than the deal price, exposing the
client to serious losses.161  In the case of a clean merger, the courts have
Chancery looks at appraisal value in specific classes of mergers, this Court must
give deference”).
154. See id. at 366 (“[W]e do not share DFC’s confidence in our ability to
craft, on a general basis, the precise pre-conditions that would be necessary to
invoke a presumption of that kind.”).
155. See id. at 388 (“In some cases, it may be that a single valuation metric
[besides deal price] is the most reliable evidence of fair value and that giving
weight to another factor will do nothing but distort that best estimate.”).
156. See Meyer, supra note 54, at 191 (“Increased use of merger price as the
best evidence of fair value could have a dramatic effect on appraisal arbitrageurs’
investment strategy.”).
157. See Davis, supra note 41, at 1 (describing predictability of profit from ap-
praisal arbitrage prior to DFC Global).
158. See id. (noting Delaware Supreme Court’s requirement that “substantial
record-based evidence must support a judicial decision that other factors outweigh
a fairly negotiated deal price in an appraisal valuation.”).  Davis writes that “absent
unusual circumstances, such as a conflict of interest or related party transaction,”
the deal price will function as “the lodestar for appraisal proceedings.” See id. at 2
(arguing that deal price is best indicator of fair value).
159. See, e.g., Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd, No.
565, 2016, 2017 WL 6375829 (Del. Dec. 14, 2017) (remanding to Court of Chan-
cery to give greater or exclusive weight to deal price).
160. See Onyeador, supra note 4, at 357 (noting that “appraisal proceedings
usually cost millions of dollars to litigate”).  Offsetting this risk to a degree,
§ 262(j) allows for equitable fee shifting. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(j) (West
2017) (allowing equitable fee shifting in appraisal litigation).
161. See Frankel, supra note 56 (noting Court of Chancery’s valuations at less
than deal price creates risk for arbitrageurs); see also LongPath Capital, LLC v.
Ramtron Int’l Corp., No. CV 8094-VCP, 2015 WL 4540443 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015)
(valuing company at deal price and subtracting synergies to arrive at appraisal
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simply not found that meritorious litigation is likely.162  This opens the
possibility that the attorney or law firm bringing the appraisal could be
seen as filing strike suits, and the attorney’s and law firm’s reputation
could suffer as a result.163
Attorneys should not deter clients from practicing arbitrage, but
should be sophisticated in picking the mergers to target.164  Evidence sug-
gests that appraisal arbitrage can be an effective tool to solve a collective
action problem by litigating where individual and unsophisticated share-
holders would have little motivation to vindicate their rights.165  In these
situations, the courts do not discourage arbitrage, and the practice will
likely continue.166  Even the advocates of appraisal arbitrage, however,
agree that the practice is less effective and perhaps unneeded where the
market has determined a price in a fair sale process.167  Appraisal litigants
value below deal price); Meyer, supra note 54, at 178 (noting that “policy motiva-
tions may have also been at play in the court’s decision” in LongPath).
162. See, e.g., Glasscock, supra note 13, at 10 (arguing that believing in ap-
praisal rights in clean transaction requires believing in several “unlikely” proposi-
tions).  Vice Chancellor Glasscock suggests that anyone who believes that fair value
should not be set at the deal price in a clean transaction must also believe that (1)
there is an inherent value to an entity independent of the market, (2) the inherent
value can be higher than that developed by a clean sale, and (3) the inherent value
is higher than determined by a disinterested board. See id.  (arguing for deal price
as best indicator of fair value).  “These propositions are, to my mind,” Vice Chan-
cellor Glasscock writes, “more or less unlikely.” See id. (evaluating extra-market
factors incorporated into value).
163. Cf. Kesten, supra note 7, at 114–15 (describing interest rate arbitrage as
nuisance suit and “rent seeking”).
164. See Tucker, supra note 29 (suggesting investors should actively pursue
appraisal arbitrage while it is still allowed in Delaware).
165. See Boca, supra note 50, at 446 (describing arbitrage’s ability to solve col-
lective action problem by decreasing costs for smaller shareholders to dissent).
Appraisal actions often suffer from an acute collective action problem because,
with some exceptions, class action litigation is prohibited, so plaintiffs must bring
claims individually. See id. (describing requirements for bringing appraisal arbi-
trage claim).  “[I]t is often cost prohibitive for small shareholders to pursue this
remedy.” See Kesten, supra note 7, at 100 (describing restrictions on appraisal pro-
cess).  Arbitrage creates sufficient motivation to make it more feasible to bring a
claim without creating the agency problems brought by class action. See Boca,
supra note 50, at 446 (describing benefits of arbitrage).
166. See Onyeador, supra note 4, at 357 (noting that neither amendment of
§ 262 prevents arbitrage, and in fact amendments may discourage individual share-
holder appraisal while continuing to allow appraisal by arbitrageurs).
167. See Korsmo, supra note 5, at 1557 (arguing “a genuine market test of the
target company will necessarily provide a superior valuation of the stockholders’
interest, and in such circumstances an appraisal proceeding can only cause mis-
chief”).  Korsmo argues in favor of appraisal arbitrage to the extent that it targets
deals vulnerable to minority shareholder exploitation. See id. at 1556 (arguing for
benefits of appraisal arbitrage).  Korsmo goes so far as to argue the practice should
be encouraged and used as a model for other areas of corporate litigation. See id.
(suggesting arbitrage could be model for corporate litigation).  Despite this strong
position in favor of arbitrage, when it comes to a fair and robust sale process,
Korsmo suggests going further than the Delaware Supreme Court or the Delaware
Legislature and creating a “safe harbor” to freeze appraisal at the deal price in
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should listen to the message from the Delaware courts and legislature: ap-
praisal arbitrage “ought to lead to litigation that bears markers of litigation
merit.”168  This means targeting cases for arbitrage where minority share-
holders are most likely to be exploited.169  Attorneys should counsel arbi-
trageurs toward controlled, conflicted, or low premium mergers, where
arbitrage is most likely to be profitable and will also benefit other minority
shareholders.170
Finally, after DFC Global, it is no longer the case that appraisal arbi-
trage looms “regardless of how hard seasoned M&A advisors and corpo-
rate fiduciaries work to ensure a process that is robust and pristine.”171
Attorneys who advise clients on mergers and acquisitions can now work
positively to avoid the price tag of appraisal arbitrage by encouraging ro-
bust auctions, fair prices, and arm’s-length transactions.172  Limiting the
fair value in an appraisal arbitrage action to the deal price could save a
client hundreds of millions of dollars, an amount worth considering in
making every effort to conduct a clean merger.173
such transactions. See id. at 1557 (“[W]e would support the development of a safe
harbor to eliminate appraisal where the transaction has undergone a true
auction.”).
168. See id. at 1583 (arguing appraisal arbitrage ought to target limited set of
“right transactions”).
169. Cf. Onyeador, supra note 4, at 353 (noting that “[t]heoretically, appraisal
arbitrageurs should want to target deals with a high probability of underpricing”).
The “theoretical” transactions that arbitrageurs should be targeting are the exact
transactions the Delaware courts and legislature are now effectively constraining
them to target. See supra notes 178-80 for a discussion of the probable effects of the
legislative amendments combined with DFC Global.
170. See Kesten, supra note 7, at 112–13 (claiming there is lack of evidence
that threat of appraisal increases deal premiums offered in all situations (citing
Paul G. Mahoney & Mark Weinstein, The Appraisal Remedy and Merger Premiums, 1
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 239, 242–43 (1999))).
171. See Frankel, supra note 50, at 20 (discussing motivation of mergers and
acquisitions attorneys to conduct clean mergers).
172. Cf. id. (suggesting lack of motivation to conduct clean merger because of
ubiquity of appraisal arbitrage).  Frankel’s comments are particularly illuminating,
as they were written just before the DFC Global opinion was released. See id.  Citing
the Delaware Supreme Court’s Golden Telecom case from 2010, he notes that “the
Court of Chancery will not be bound by the deal price as the sole determinant of
fair value in an appraisal action,” and that “[a]s a result, the potential for signifi-
cant cost uncertainty looms on the Delaware transaction landscape, regardless of
how hard seasoned M&A advisors and corporate fiduciaries work to ensure a pro-
cess that is robust and pristine.” See id. (noting effects of Golden Telecom on mergers
and acquisitions advisors).  With the issuance of DFC Global—and now Dell—Fran-
kel’s advisory warning is no longer the case: those same mergers and acquisitions
advisors and corporate fiduciaries have a great deal of certainty that if they create a
robust and pristine sale, the deal price will be given deference. See DFC Glob.
Corp v. Muirfield Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 370–71 (Del. 2017) (emphasizing
deference to market price).
173. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 50 (describing how Carl Icahn’s threat of
appraisal action successfully blocked deal and raised price 400 million dollars).
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V. CARRY THAT WEIGHT: DFC GLOBAL WILL CONTINUE TO CURB
ARBITRAGE IN CLEAN MERGERS
In December 2017, the Delaware Supreme Court issued Dell, Inc. v.
Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd,174 the first “progeny” of DFC
Global.175  In Dell, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed an appraisal
when the Court of Chancery ruled that the sale price severely undervalued
the computer giant.176 Dell demonstrates the Delaware Supreme Court
doubled-down on the principle it set forth in DFC Global: in a clean sale,
there must be an extraordinary reason to depart from the deal price.177
Though cases in recent years show that the Court of Chancery generally
adheres to this principle, DFC Global sets a strong standard in case law for
the lower court to look to when it refuses to appraise above the deal
price.178  The ultimate effect will be to severely limit the arbitrage practice
in clean transactions.179
While the precedent DFC Global set is clear, the effect on shareholders
and on the market is less so.180  Studies conducted on appraisal arbitrage
174. No. 565, 2016, 2017 WL 6375829, at *1 (Del. 2017).
175. See Lewkow, supra note 29 (“Dell builds on the Court’s DFC decision
earlier this year in which the Court held that the merger price will generally be
entitled to significant, if not dispositive, weight in an appraisal action involving the
sale of a public company pursuant to an open, competitive, and arm’s-length bid-
ding process.”).  As Lewkow notes, Dell expands on DFC Global by applying the
same principles even when there is “a limited pre-signing bidding process” and in
non-controlling management buyouts. See id. (noting Dell’s expansion on DFC
Global holding).
176. See Dell, Inc., 2017 WL 6375829, at *1–2 (reversing and remanding to
Court of Chancery for reappraisal).
177. See id. at *34 (allowing Court of Chancery to reappraise at deal price
without further review).
178. See DFC Glob. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 366 (Del.
2017)  (noting that judicial presumption of deal price as fair value would be largely
superfluous because Court of Chancery already consistently exercises this
standard).
179. See, e.g., Glasscock, supra note 13, at 10 (finding “little to recommend
extending an appraisal right to dissenters in the case of a ‘clean’ merger” because
“efficiency of capital markets, not fairness, is the proper goal of the appraisal stat-
ute”); Meyer, supra note 54, at 191 (predicting outcome of limiting appraisal to
deal price “could be the death knell for appraisal as a speculative investment
strategy”).
180. See Kidwell, supra note 48 (analyzing effect of Delaware’s legislative and
judicial amendments limiting arbitrage and suggesting it caused deal premiums to
decline).  Kidwell cites a Harvard Law study that shows “the decrease in deal pre-
miums from 2016 to 2017 resulted in target shareholders losing around $77.4 bil-
lion.” See id. (describing effects of Delaware’s statutory amendments (citing
Matthew Schoenfeld, The High Cost of Fewer Appraisal Claims in 2017: Premia Down,
Agency Costs Up, HARVARD L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sep.
8, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/09/08/the-high-cost-of-fewer-ap-
praisal-claims-in-2017-premia-down-agency-costs-up/ [https://perma.cc/8QY2-
NKU5]).  Kidwell suggests these findings may demonstrate that arbitrage did not
have a dampening effect on mergers and acquisitions. See id. (suggesting arbitrage
may not have had negative market effect).
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suggest it may benefit shareholders regardless of whether the transaction
is clean.181  The threat of appraisal drives up sale prices, even if the deal is
clean.182  If present trends continue, however, arbitrage will be contained
to those transactions where it can help provide meaningful appraisal
rights to minority shareholders.183
181. See id. (suggesting Delaware’s starvation of arbitrage practice has lowered
deal prices). But see Kesten, supra note 7, at 92 (“If appraisal litigation is increas-
ingly an exercise in rent seeking or interest rate arbitrage, it threatens to impose
an inefficient transaction tax on certain mergers and may deter some worthwhile
transactions altogether.”).
182. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 30 (indicating that “directors will be less san-
guine about a proposal they submit to the shareholders for approval if they believe
there is an efficient mechanism for shareholders to realize an alternatively deter-
mined value for their shares than that being recommended by the board of direc-
tors.”); Korsmo, supra note 5, at 1556 (“A highly developed appraisal arbitrage
market would aid minority shareholders . . . by deterring abusive mergers and by
causing shares traded post-announcement to be bid up to the expected value of an
appraisal claim.”).
183. See Geis, supra note 49, at 1639 (describing possibility of minority share-
holders using increased appraisal activity created by arbitrage to gain more mean-
ingful appraisal rights).
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